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Executive Summary: 
Our study  reviews the process towards creating a single European retail banking market. The EU has aimed at 
integrating the traditionally heterogeneous banking market in Europe by means of harmonizing legislation. While 
the wholesale banking market integration is considered to be more advanced, retail banking integration is still in its 
infancy. Cross-border lending, cross-border mergers, and the promises of new technologies have not yet delivered 
the creation of a single retail banking market. In this paper we provide new evidence on this issue. In particular, we 
find that there are some tendencies for a more integrated corporate lending market, while consumer lending markets 
are still remaining more fragmented. We identify three reasons for a lack of integration: A lack of international 
arbitrage, a limited pass-through of interest rate changes onto lending rates, and a limited national and international 
competitive retail banking environment. The results also suggest that the introduction of the single currency  may 
have already made a positive impact on retail banking market integration. 
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1. Introduction 
 
An integrated market for financial services is been considered an essential part of the European 
Union’s (EU) single market project. In the wording of a recent communication from the EU 
Commission to the council and the European parliament it reads: “The Lisbon European councils 
deadline of 2005 to establish an integrated European market in financial services is central to the 
community’s employment and growth agenda.” This is especially true since finance in Europe is 
traditionally bank dominated. While the creation of a single wholesale banking market is generally 
considered to be more advanced, integration in retail banking is often perceived to be lacking 
behind in particular since lending and borrowing activities take place mostly within a narrow 
geographic region. One reason for these localized retail banking markets where banks are neither 
reaching out for all prospective Euroland customers, nor are consumers shopping around for credits 
in the whole Euroland is given by Padoa-Schioppa (2000), who argues that “proximity is an 
intrinsic characteristic of the retail market with or without the emergence of a currency embracing a 
wider area”.  
 
Our study contributes to this discussion and provides new evidence on the state and development of 
integration of European retail banking markets. In section 2, we discuss the major trends in 
European banking regulation and market developments. In section 3, we provide new evidence on 
the emergence of a single Euroland retail banking market. In particular we investigate the current 
state of integration for three different credit instruments across ten Euroland countries between 1995 
and 2000. Section 4 concludes by pointing to the continuously important role of competition policy 
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and the special role of the single currency in the process of integrating European retail banking 
markets. 
 
2. Structure and trends in European banking market integration 
 
2.1. European  banking: From heterogeneity to the single market project 
The national differences in European banking, which the EU is trying to overcome have their roots 
in the late 19th century. The European banking system developed historically from the unit-based 
banking system of the 17th and 18th century to the early 19th century bi-polar system consisting of 
town-based banks financing domestic and international trade and country-based banks financing the 
local, predominantly agricultural economy. The change towards a more diverse banking system 
consisting of savings banks, building societies, cooperatives, joint-stock town-based banks, and 
country banks was brought about at the end of the 19th century by the industrial revolution. With the 
increased importance of town-based banks, financial centres such as London or Paris developed. 
Parallel, the first branch systems developed so that by the end of the century most European 
countries had a nationwide branch system created by the large, joint-stock banks. In each country, 
the competition between country-based (regional) banks and town-based (national) banks took a 
different form and led to heterogeneity in European banking. Furthermore, the relationship between 
industry and banks shaped the market. Whereas in the UK, banks focussed more on financing trade 
and less on financing industry, the ties between industry and banks were much closer in continental 
Europe. Consequently, UK industrial firms looked to the financial markets for funding (see 
Molyneux, 1996). With the growing importance of industry over trade, the UK financial system 
developed to be more market oriented whereas the continental European system became mainly 
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bank oriented. In general, however, bank lending plays a dominant role in providing funds to the 
corporate, private, and public sector in the whole of Europe.  
 
Based on data for 1999 provided by the European Central Bank (ECB) (2000a) (see Table 1), in 
the Euroland bank loans amounted to a larger percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) 
than in the US or Japanese system. In contrast, market based forms of funding which are an 
alternative for corporations are used to a lesser extend in the Euroland.  
 
Table 1: Euro-Area Characteristics in June 1999 (in percent of GDP) 
 Euro Area USA Japan 
Bank Loans 100.4 48.4 107.0 
Outstanding domestic debt securities 88.8 164.6 126.5 
   - issues by corporates 3.3 29.0 14.6 
   - issued by financial institutions 31.0 45.4 18.8 
   - issued by the public sector 54.5 90.2 93.1 
Stock Market Capitalization 71.1 163.3 137.7 
Source: ECB Monthly Bulletin, January 2000.  
Note: All data are for June 1999 except for stock market capitalization, which are for October 1999. 
 
The EU is striving to overcome the heterogeneity in European banking in order to create a single 
market for financial services. Reviewing the regulatory process towards financial integration in 
Europe reveals that even if the establishment of the common market has been an objective in the 
EU since the 1957 Treaty of Rome and has been reinforced by the 1985 White Paper and the 
1986 Single European Act, very little had been achieved even on a regulatory level until the 2nd 
BD of 1989. Regarding key regulatory elements, the First Banking Directive (1st BD) of 1977 
which allowed for cross border branching under the host country rule1 was not very effective in 
reducing differences between national regulatory systems and was thus followed by a 2nd BD. 
This 2nd BD relied on three fundamental principles of harmonisation, mutual recognition, and 
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home country control and supervision2 - the latter representing a complete turnaround in 
regulatory policy compared to the 1st BD. Since 1986, additional directives which are aimed at 
further harmonization of the different national EU banking markets have been passed concerning 
bank supervision, capital adequacy, solvency standards, money laundering, consumer credit, or 
publishing and consolidation of annual accounts to name but a few3. In the area of consumer 
credit, in 1986 the European Community introduced a consumer credit directive. The main two 
objectives of this directive were consumer protection and facilitation of cross-border credit by 
means of harmonisation of the banks’ information provision to its customers. This directive was 
amended and completed by two more consumer credit directives in 1990 and 1998, respectively4. 
Following more than a decade of designing and implementing financial market legislation, the 
EU has now adopted a Financial Services Action Plan with the explicit objective to “devise a 
strategy for improving the operation of the single market in financial services, based on effective 
application of current legislation and amendment of the legislation where it is ineffective or 
incomplete” (Commission Of the European Union, 1998). On January 1, 1999, the Euro replaced 
the national currencies of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Of the remaining EU countries, Greece 
initially failed to meet the required economic criteria but joined EMU on January 1, 2001, 
whereas Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom decided not join the EMU as yet.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1 Under the host country rule a bank had to obtain permission to operate in a foreign country by the supervisory 
agencies of that country. 
2 Harmonisation should lead to a system where banks operating in several countries face a common set of EU 
regulations. Mutual recognition implies that the banking charter of the home country is sufficient to operate in all 
EU countries. Home country rule, finally, stipulates that foreign owned banks are regulated by their home country 
and not by the host country. 
3 For details see Kleimeier (2001), Sander and Kleimeier (2000), Diez Guardia (2000), Zimmerman (1995). 
4 For details and evaluation see Diez Guardia (2000). 
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2.2 Integration as a market-driven process 
Assessing the Euroland banking markets, integration can be considered as far advanced from a 
purely legal perspective (Zimmerman 1995, Bredemeier 1995). However, many observers find 
that such a single market is not yet fully present in all areas of financial services. Whereas 
Euroland interbank and wholesale markets are considered to be more integrated, the extent of 
integration in the retail banking markets is often being questioned. For example, the Commission 
of the European Union (1999) states that “the Union’s financial markets remain segmented and 
business and consumers continue to be deprived of direct access to cross-border financial 
institutions.” Following this line of reasoning, for regulation to become effective the market 
should react to these legal developments. The major driving forces for integrating retail banking 
are cross-border lending and cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Moreover and more 
recently, information technology (IT) is often said to have the potential to create a single market. 
The impact of these three developments on retail market integration will be discussed briefly in the 
following sections. 
 
Cross border lending 
At present, the focus in bank lending and deposit taking is clearly domestic. As data reported by 
the ECB (2000b) shows that in 1999 79.8 per cent of all loans were domestic. This figure 
increases even to 91.2 per cent when considering only loans to the non-bank private sector. 
Regarding deposits, 72.8 per cent of all deposits and 86.5 per cent of deposits to the non-bank 
private sector were domestic. However, the growth rates for all Euroland activities - with the 
exception of deposits from the non-bank private sector - are positive and larger than the 
corresponding growth rates for domestic activities. Furthermore, the market shares of foreign 
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banks in Europe are still very low as Table 2 shows. Whereas in most countries the market share 
of European banks is higher than that of third country banks, the size of the market share is still 
very low for most countries. On an overall average, the market share of foreign banks originating 
from the (at that time) European Economic Area (EEA) countries amounts to only 3.4 percent of 
the total assets of domestic banks in 1997. With the exception of Belgium, Ireland and 
Luxembourg, the market share of foreign EEA banks is less than 10%.  
 
Table 2: Market Share of Foreign Banks as Percentage of the Total Assets of Domestic Banks (end 1997) 
Country From EEA Countries  From Third Countries  Total 
 Branches Subsidiaries  Branches Subsidiaries   
Belgium 9.0 19.2  6.9 1.2  36.3 
Germany 0.9 1.4  0.7 1.2  4.3 
Spain 4.8 3.4  1.6 1.9  11.7 
France1 2.5   2.7   9.8 
Ireland 17.7 27.8  1.2 6.9  53.6 
Italy 3.6 1.7  1.4 0.1  6.8 
Luxembourg 19.4 65.7  1.4 8.1  94.6 
Netherlands 2.3 3.0  0.5 1.9  7.7 
Austria 0.7 1.6  0.1 1.0  3.3 
Portugal 2.5 6.8  0.1 1.0  10.5 
Finland 7.1 0.0  0.0 0.0  7.1 
Euroland weighted average 3.4   1.6   12.7 
Source: Belaisch et.al. (2001), Table 10. Blanks indicate missing values. 1 Data for 1996. 
 
The evidence in table 2 does not allow the conclusion that a truly Europe-wide banking system 
has emerged yet. In that case one would expect higher and more uniform market shares.  
 
Cross border mergers 
The EU regulatory process sparked two phases of bank M&As in Europe: The first phase took 
place in the late 1980s and early 1990s in reaction to the 2nd BD and the second phase took place 
in the second half of the 1990s in anticipation of the EMU (Tourani Rad and van Beek, 1999). 
Reviewing the evidence on M&As in European banking reveals that M&As predominantly take 
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place within national borders and within the same type (see Table A1 and Table 3). From Table 3 
note first that the total value of domestic M&As exceeds that of cross-border M&As, mainly 
driven by acquisitions of commercial banks and securities firms. Only for insurance companies 
the value of cross-border M&As exceed the value of domestic M&As. This implies that 
consolidation is still taking place on a national rather than international level. Furthermore, for 
commercial banks and securities firms M&As within Europe are as important as other foreign 
M&As, indicating a global rather than regional consolidation process. Second, consolidation 
within the sector is more common than consolidation across sectors – with domestic M&As and 
to a lesser extend Europe-Non-Europe M&As when the acquirer is a securities firm being the 
only exceptions5. Furthermore, Belaisch et.al (2001) argue that the speed of M&As, it seems 
however, that the speed has increased in recent years for large banks, as the majority of the 30 
largest Euroland banks listed in Table A1 are the result of a merger. As an alternative to cross-
border M&As which can be difficult – for example due to a government’s interest in limited 
foreign ownership in key institutions or to create ‘national champions’ – alliances have been 
favoured as Table A2 shows. In addition, M&As between smaller banks has been continuously 
ongoing for several years and resulted in an overall decrease of the number of banks per country. 
Examples can be found when looking at the numbers of German savings banks and credit 
cooperatives, which fell by 5 and 13 percent, respectively, between 1995 and 2000. Taken 
together these findings show that the typical EU bank can still be characterised as a domestic 
bank.  
                                                          
5 It is interesting to note that the only strategy which can be characterised as clearly European is the acquisition 
strategy that insurance company follow within Europe when acquiring banks. This strategy amounts to 13.4% of all 
Intra-European M&As and is the only M&As type for which the intra-European percentage is higher than either the 
domestic or the non-Europe share. Thus, it appears that a European trend towards ALLFINANZ might be emerging.  
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Table 3: Value of M&As in the financial sector between 1985 and 1997 
 ACQUIRER 
 commercial bank securities firm insurance company 
TARGET value % of total value % of total value % of total 
Panel A: Domestic M&As       
commercial bank 89.0 36.0 23.0 9.3 11.0 4.4 
securities firm 9.0 3.6 19.0 7.7 6.0 2.4 
insurance company 20.0 8.1 24.0 9.7 46.0 18.6 
Panel B: Intra-European M&As       
commercial bank 15.0 17.9 4.3 5.1 11.2 13.4 
securities firm 8.7 10.4 5.8 6.9 0.3 0.4 
insurance company 0.4 0.5 1.1 1.3 37.0 44.2 
Panel C: Europe-Non-Europe M&As       
commercial bank 14.5 14.5 15.6 15.6 1.0 1.0 
securities firm 4.3 4.3 15.9 15.9 3.1 3.1 
insurance company 0.3 0.3 12.9 12.9 32.7 32.7 
Source: Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999). Values are given in billion of US dollar. For each panel, the per cent figures sum to 100. 
 
 
The potential impact of IT 
IT has influenced all areas of banking through an internal as well as an external channel. In 
particular its external application, which shapes the way in which customers access a bank’s 
services. Here, traditional branch banking is slowly – though not fully – being replaced by 
remote banking via automated teller machines (ATM), electronic money, telephone banking, on-
line security trading, or internet banking. The crucial issue is to what extend remote banking has 
a potential to promote retail financial market integration. As stated recently in the EU 
Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan “E-Commerce is already revolutionizing retailing 
and distribution of many financial services. Suppliers - EU and non-EU – will be able to make 
contact with potential users across national boundaries at minimal distribution cost. Users will 
benefit from a wider range of innovative products. The overall impact will be to reinforce and 
cement market integration.”  
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As Table 4 reveals, the extent to which remote banking is implemented differs across Europe. 
ATMs and telephone banking are the most widely developed remote banking services, with an 
average growth rate of 50% between 1993 and 1997. Access to telephone banking is still limited 
and ranges from below 5% in Finland, Italy, and Sweden to 10% in France and the United 
Kingdom. Telephone banking has also been increasing during the 1990s but might be replaced 
by internet banking. The density and growth of ‘electronic funds transfer at the point of sale’ 
(EFTPOS) illustrates the use of electronic payment instruments. Exceptionally high growth rates 
can be observed here but the difference between European countries is still quite pronounced. It 
appears that at the end of the 1990s cash still plays an important role but is used for smaller and 
more spontaneous payments whereas electronic payments are used for larger and more regular 
transactions (ECB 1999c). 
 
Table 4: Selected remote banking services across Europe 
country telephone 
banking1 
ATM machines EFTPOS terminals electronic money in 
1997 
  number in 
19972 
change 
1993-97 
number in 
19972 
change 
1993-97 
number of 
cards3 
number of 
loading 
machines 
Austria  n.a.  533  +67 %  1,652  +621 %  3,400  3,495 
Belgium  5 %  492  +76 %  6,284  +48 %  3,430  6,438 
Denmark  n.a.  253 +134 %  11,923  +184 %  n.a.  3 
Finland  2 %  445  -25 %  10,506  +27 %  189  2,100 
France  10 %  462  +42 %  9,555  +4 %  n.a.  n.a. 
Germany  6 %  504  +64 %  1,984  +475 %  35,000  20,000 
Greece  n.a.  209 +155 %  2,831  +1,075 %  0  0 
Ireland  5 %  286  +30 %  1,402  n.a. %  0  0 
Italy  3 %  444  +69 %  4,896  +268 %  62  945 
Luxembourg  n.a.  613 +109 %  11,071  +32 %  0  0 
Netherlands  5 %  410  +41 %  7,715  +381 %  n.a.  n.a. 
Portugal  n.a.  631 +123 %  6,022  +116 %  384  5,129 
Spain  6 %  863  +55 %  16,691  +101 %  3,502  10,942 
Sweden  4 %  268  +5 %  7,778  +155 %  n.a.  n.a. 
United Kingdom  10 %  393  +20 %  8,984  +94 %  113  1,295 
Source: ECB (1999c). n.a. indicates that data are not available. 1 For Germany and Italy in per cent of retail bank 
accounts. For Netherlands and Sweden in per cent of payment transactions. For France, Minitel users. For all 
other countries, in per cent of retail customer base. Data for 1997 and 1998 with the exception of 1996 for 
Belgium. 2 per 1 million inhabitants. 3 in thousands.  
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Cost considerations and competitiveness have been the main motivators for banks to introduce 
IT as cost reductions of 60 to 70 per cent can be achieved by ATMs and EFTPOS or 75 to 99 per 
cent by internet banking when compared to branch banking. IT influences the competitive 
position of banks as it allows for price reductions due to falling cost, faster response time to 
customer requests, more tailor-made bank services based on readily available customer 
information, and access to new markets due to the deterioration of geographic restrictions that 
were present in branch banking but less so in remote banking (ECB 1999a, 1999b). However, the 
advances in IT have not yet led to any significant integration of retail markets. One reason might 
be the still high cost of cross-border money transfer which prevents retail customers from using a 
foreign bank’s service even if it is accessible on-line. Furthermore, the Commission’s (1999) 
Action Plan clearly outlined that uncertainties remain in the areas of marketing rules for financial 
products, information and transparency regarding contractual characteristics including redress 
procedures. Thus, whereas the potential for IT to enhance the integration of financial markets in 
Europe is clearly given, many obstacles still have to be eliminated. Realizing this need, the EU is 
currently discussing proposals for an E-Commerce Directive and a Distance Selling Directive. 
 
3. New evidence on the emergence of a single Euroland retail banking market 
 
Despite the regulatory efforts for creating an integrated Euroland banking market the market 
reaction in terms of cross-border lending and cross-border mergers has been limited so far and IT 
has not yet developed to its full potential. Nevertheless, at a first glance lending rates across 
Euroland appear today to be more similar than in the past. As discussed in the following, looking 
simply at interest rate convergence may be misleading when judging credit market integration. 
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We therefore propose a different methodology. With this methodology we empirically 
investigate the current state of integration for 3 different credit instruments across 10 Euroland 
countries and over two different time periods. Based on this analysis, we are able to confirm the 
limited extend of the integration process so far. However, we also find that the introduction of 
the single currency is already showing an impact on lending market integration in particular with 
respect to corporate lending, pointing to the important role of a competitive environment in 
banking.  
 
3.1. Convergence of interest rates? 
In 1988 the Commission of the European Communities commissioned a study, now widely known 
as the Cecchini report (Commission of the European Communities, 1988), which derived 
quantitative estimates of the benefits of financial market integration. The study predicted that post-
integration prices will fall to a level equal to the prices of the country with the lowest pre-integration 
prices. The Cecchini study advances the hypothesis of price equalization for financial assets 
within Europe as the characteristic of completely integrated markets. This "law of one price" 
manifests itself in financial markets as the "interest rate parity". From the point of view of the 
Cecchini study convergence of interest rates would reflect the emergence of a single retail 
banking market in Euroland. In a recent study (Kleimeier and Sander, 2001) carried out for the 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI) of the Centre for European Policy Study (CEPS) we 
have investigated the development of three key retail interest rates in the Euroland: mortgage 
loans to households (N2), consumer loans to households (N3), and the lending rate charged to 
the corporate sector (N4). The data source is the ECB's National Retail Interest Rates Statistics 
(N2, N3, and N4 refer to the number of the series as reported by the ECB). The rates are 
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available on a monthly basis starting in the 1980s with most countries reporting regularly as off 
1989. We concentrate here, however, to report for the period from April 1995 to December 2000 
as for this time data for all countries are available on a regular base and because this is indeed the 
phase when the emergence of a single retail banking market is expected. 
 
Figure 1 and 2 show the evolution of all three reported interest rates in both, nominal and real 
terms since 1995. A first observation is that all nominal rates are now closer together then they 
were in the mid-1990s. This convergence can, however, largely be attributed to the effect of 
macroeconomic factors, in particular the single monetary policy. When policy-determined 
interest rates and – consequently – short-term money market rates are converging, lending rates 
should also align more closely. This in itself is thus not yet a sign of an integrated lending 
market. Secondly, mortgage rates are now closer together than other lending rates. For example, 
while Italy had the highest average mortgage rate of 11.1% in the pre-EMU phase and Belgium 
with 6.1% the lowest rate, both countries have in the EMU phase an almost identical average rate 
of about 6%. This is not so surprising since the credit characteristics of mortgages across 
countries are more similar throughout Euroland than lending rates charged for the other credit 
forms, which differ more widely in their underlying characteristics (as well as in their statistical 
definition).  Thirdly, and more surprisingly, the real, consumer price inflation-corrected cost of 
mortgage borrowing still differs widely throughout the Euroland, with the highest real cost in 
France (5.2%) and the lowest in Ireland (1.4%). In a way one can say that the effectiveness of the 
convergence process for nominal mortgage rate leaves the consumer with diverging real cost of 
(mortgage) borrowing across Euroland. The reasons are, of course, the differences in consumer  
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Figure 1: Nominal Interest Rates 
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Panel B: Consumer Lending Rates 
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Panel C: Corporate Lending Rates 
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Figure 2: Real Interest Rates 
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price inflation, typically and ironically leading to the highest real borrowing cost in those 
countries where the economy is most sluggish. Forth, for real and nominal consumer and 
corporate lending the cross-country differences have become smaller, but they still remain large, 
in particular for consumer lending rates. 
 
3.2. The non-applicability of the law of one price in credit markets 
While from the point of view of the Cecchini study convergence of interest rates would reflect 
the emergence of a single retail banking market in Euroland, we argue elsewhere (Kleimeier and 
Sander, 2001) that the law of one price is not the correct point of reference to make statements 
on the state of integration of credit markets. Typically, interest rate parity is suggested as parity 
for interest rates on such assets like government bonds, which are perfect substitutes under the 
condition of perfect capital mobility. This is clearly not the case for bank assets like loans. On 
the one hand, loans are characterized by heterogeneity caused by risk differences, cultural 
influences in bank-client relationship, country-specific strategic bank behaviour in order to cope 
with informational imperfections (moral hazard, incentive effects etc.), etc. Consequently, one 
cannot expect the law of one price to hold in the strict sense in the retail banking market. On the 
other hand, there is clearly not (yet) a perfect "capital" mobility that can bring about price 
equalization by means of cross-border arbitrage. As discussed in the previous section, banks are 
neither reaching out for all prospective Euroland customers, nor are consumers shopping around 
for credits in the whole of Euroland, nor is electronic banking yet filling the cross-border lending 
gap. In other words, retail banking is (still) localized. Thus, retail interest rates may not as easily 
equalize as suggested by the Cecchini study. To the contrary, when interest rates are equalizing 
in the presence of differing underlying credit characteristics this cannot even be interpreted as a 
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sign of an emerging integrated banking market. Consequently, looking simply at interest rate 
convergence can be profoundly misleading. 
 
We therefore propose to base the judgement on the degree of integration in the retail banking 
market on the existence of "co-integration" among national credit markets in Euroland 
(Kleimeier and Sander, 2000 and 2001). This concept realizes that although full equalization 
cannot be expected, market integration requires that interest rates should exhibit a certain long-
term equilibrium relationship. Thus, we do not require that the national interest rate of a country 
(Lnat) should equal the average interest rate in the remaining Euroland (LEU) as it would be 
required by the "law of one price" shown in equation (1): 
(1) L nat = LEU 
Rather, we accept as a possible long-term relationship that the rates may and eventually should 
even differ from each other, e.g. by reflected differences in the underlying credit characteristics 
such that: 
(2) Lnat =  a + b LEU  
Equation (2) can be interpreted as a relationship that holds in the long-term, while in the short-
term deviations from this long-run equilibrium are possible. The existence of such a long-term 
relationship would reflect the existence of an integrated financial system in which “structural 
trends and systematic disturbances in banking cut across state borders”6.  
 
                                                          
6 For this sentence we have used the words of Padoa-Schioppa (2000) with which he refers to the localized US 
financial system that is commonly viewed as integrated. 
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Equation (2) could in principle be estimated by means of regression analysis. However, since 
interest rates typically follow a “random-walk”, also known as an “integrated time series”, one 
may obtain spurious results from regression analysis. To establish that there exists a certain long-
term relationship one therefore has to undertake a co-integration analysis (for analytical details 
see Kleimeier and Sander, 2000 and 2001). If co-integration is found, this reflects that markets 
are integrated such that national interest rates are connected in terms of a long-term relationship 
as shown in equation (2). In the short-run, however, deviations from this long-run equilibrium 
can occur but should be corrected over time by one or more of the following three mechanisms: 
• An international arbitrage process where banks increasingly shift their lending activities to 
countries where lending rates are the highest while consumers borrow in countries with the 
lowest interest rates (cross-border lending).  
• When money market rates equalize by means of an international arbitrage process such 
changes will eventually be passed-through onto lending rates via domestic competition that 
ties lending and borrowing rates together (interest rate pass-through). 
• Increased (international) competition, or the threat of it as suggested by the theory of 
contestable markets, may help to harmonize the pricing behaviour of banks and thus lead to a 
harmonization of retail prices. 
 
We have investigated the presence or non-presence of such a long-term relationship among 
Euroland retail banking markets and inquired into these three mechanisms that eventually bind 
national retail interest rates together. In the following we summarize the major finding of the 
study. 
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3.3. Are Euroland retail banking markets already integrated? 
Our judgement on the emergence of an integrated European banking system is based on the 
result of the co-integration analyses that we performed for all retail lending rates for Euroland 
countries in both, nominal and real terms. The period of investigation is April 1995 to December 
2000. We also distinguish a “pre-Euro period” characterized by the process of implementing the 
single market up to the end of 1998 and a second “Euro-period” that is characterized by the 
introduction of the single currency after 1.1.1999. While we are confident that the methodology 
we propose is helpful in monitoring the progress towards an integrated European banking 
market, the small existing database is however, a major obstacle for making to too strict 
judgements at the moment, for three reasons: First, there is no sufficiently harmonized data in 
particular on consumer credit (Diez Guardia 2000). This problem can and should be addressed in 
the future, but in the meantime the data provided by the ECB can be used as a first proxy. 
Secondly, the time period for which data for all countries are available simultaneously is very 
limited. And third, the introduction of the single currency has brought about structural changes 
that limit the available database further. In particular, by conducting a number of structural break 
tests we found that the introduction of the single currency in 1999 has sufficiently shaken up the 
structural long-term relationship. In other words, EMU has already brought about significant 
changes in the relation among national retail banking markets in Euroland. This evidence seems 
to be in line with the view that a single currency will have a major impact on the unification of a 
banking system. In a similar vein, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa (2000) from the ECB board argues 
that the “multiplicity of currencies in the single market was a fundamental factor behind the 
preservation of the segmentation of the banking industry” and that “it is indeed the existence of a 
single currency and a single central bank which very often unifies a banking system”. This, 
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however, leaves our study (and any other research) in a dilemma: Either, one ignores the 
structural breaks and includes past data that may not anymore reflect the current state of 
integration. This is, of course, from a methodological point of view not acceptable. Or one bases 
judgements on the current state of integration only on data relating to the EMU phase. This is 
methodologically correct, but limits the database from which to derive judgements to two years, 
which obviously directly limits the power of the statistical work. We have chosen the second 
way, keeping in mind the limitation of the database in making judgements. 
 
We thus tested for the existence of a long-term co-integrating relationship between national and 
the remaining Euroland retail banking markets (equation 2). If such a relationship can be 
established we speak of an integrated market. The degree of integration can then - and only then 
- be investigated by means of an corresponding “error-correction model” (ECM). This ECM 
allows us to estimate how fast the national interest rates are driven back to their long-run 
equilibrium relationship that they do have with the remaining average European countries. The 
existence and the re-approach towards such a long-term relationship after a disturbance are 
interpreted as evidence for the existence and degree of integration in the European retail banking 
market. Technically speaking, a coefficient on the error correction term is been estimated. The 
coefficient is typically between 0 and minus 1, and a value e.g. of -0.2 means that 20 percent of a 
deviation from the long-run relationship is been corrected in every time period (here every 
month), while a value of -0.5 suggests that 50% of a deviation from long-run equilibrium is been 
corrected every time period. Clearly, the closer the coefficient is to minus 1 the faster is the 
adjustment process and the more integrated are the markets. 
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Figure 3 illustrates our results for nominal interest rates, Figure 4 for real interest rates. Only for 
countries and sample or sub-sample periods where bars are shown, a co-integration relationship 
could be established. The absence of a bar therefore indicates that we do not find any evidence of 
retail market integration between this country and the remaining Euroland lending markets 
(countries for which data are not available are clearly indicated with an N.A.). The height of the 
bars then simply indicates how fast the national rates are returning to the long-term equilibrium, 
in other words how effective the arbitrage process works to re-establish the long-term 
relationship.7  
 
 
Do we then find evidence for an integrated European retail banking market? The brief answers 
are: No for mortgages, no for consumer lending, and may be for corporate lending. Looking into 
the evidence more closely we find: 
1. There is evidence in favour of co-integration with respect to mortgages in nominal terms only 
for three countries: France, Germany and the Netherlands. Whereas co-integration can be 
found for all periods in France, in Germany and the Netherlands co-integration is only 
present for the pre-EMU period and – surprisingly – not for the EMU phase. This result is 
very much in line with the still localized character of mortgage lending and strengthens our 
earlier point that judgments about integration of retail banking markets based on interest rate 
convergence can be profoundly misleading. In real, inflation-corrected terms, there is some  
                                                          
7 It should be noted, however, that in some cases despite the fact that co-integration has been accepted in the test 
procedures that the error-correction mechanism has not found to be statistically significant at convenient confidence 
levels. In such cases striped bars are being used. 
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Figure 3: Speed of Adjustment in Co-Integration of Nominal National Interest Rates versus EU Average 
Panel A: Error Correction Terms for Nominal Mortgage Rates 
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Panel B: Error Correction Terms for Nominal Consumer Rates 
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Panel C: Error Correction Terms for Nominal Corporate Rates 
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Note: Striped bars indicate that ECT is not significantly different from zero. N.A. = not available. 
N.A. N.A. N.A. 
N.A. 
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Figure 4: Speed of Adjustment in Co-Integration of Real National Interest Rates versus EU Average 
Panel A: Error Correction Terms for Real Mortgage Rates 





-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
A
us
tri
a
B
el
gi
um
Fi
nl
an
d
Fr
an
ce
G
er
m
an
y
Ir
el
an
d
Ita
ly
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
Po
rtu
ga
l
Sp
ai
n
full period pre-EMU period EMU period
 
 
Panel B: Error Correction Terms for Real Consumer Rates 
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Panel C: Error Correction Terms for Real Corporate Rates 
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Note: Striped bars indicate that ECT is not significantly different from zero. N.A. = not available. 
N.A. 
N.A. N.A. N.A. 
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more evidence in favour of the integration hypothesis despite the fact that real mortgage rate 
diverge more than nominal ones because of the inflation differentials in the first two years of 
the EMU. The real mortgage rate results may thus reflect the fact that borrowers extensively 
compare prices nationally, that the national markets are more competitive and that inflation 
expectations play an important role in the long-term oriented mortgage market. This should, 
however not misread as evidence for a cross-border arbitrage process in "real mortgages". 
We find somewhat more, but still very limited evidence for co-integration for nominal 
consumer rates. For Finland, France, Germany, Portugal, and Spain we find a statistically 
significant adjustment process towards a long-term equilibrium relationship, however, the 
speed of adjustment towards this equilibrium is very low for all countries except Portugal and 
France in the EMU period. Also in real terms the evidence for co-integration is still very 
sketchy. 
2. With regard to lending to the corporate sector the evidence is pointing to more cases where 
co-integration could be established for nominal interest rates in particular in the EMU phase, 
thus pointing to the more important role of competition (for example by the "threat" of direct 
credit finance etc.) in this sector. Specifically, for Austria, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, and Spain we find a significant speed of adjustment toward the long-run 
equilibrium relationship in the EMU period. Moreover, the speed of adjustment is higher 
than for consumer rates and ranges from –0.4 to –0.7 thus implying a time period of 2.5 to 
1.5 months. Likewise, the strongest results in favour of integration in real borrowing costs 
can be found for corporate rates. Austria and Spain show significant error correction 
mechanisms in all periods, and France and Portugal in both sub-periods, and the results for 
Belgium, Germany, and Italy indicate integration in the EMU period. 
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In sum, we find (almost) no evidence for an integrated banking market for mortgages. Our 
results for consumer lending rates are best described by a (maybe) “no”. But we do find quite 
some evidence for integration in lending to the corporate sector in the EMU phase from nominal 
as well as real rate analysis. A “maybe yes” might therefore be justified, in particular in the EMU 
phase. Our “no, no, and may be” conclusion is, however, subject to three reservations. First, and 
as mentioned before our sample size is for obvious reasons very limited for the EMU period thus 
limiting the validity of conclusions. Second, as the effects of the single currency unfold the so far 
rather sketchy evidence for integration may increase. And finally, the mechanism that may 
eventually manifest itself in an integrated banking market may after all not be brought about by 
cross-border lending, mergers & acquisitions or international arbitrage but by either interest-rate 
pass-through or competition on a national or even regional or local base. 
 
3.4. Is the transmission process efficient and symmetric? 
Rather than cross-border arbitrage, a smooth pass-through of monetary policy rate changes onto 
lending rates in all EMU member-countries can eventually lead to “tying together” of interest 
rates and “produce” the statistical artefact of evidence for or against (co-)integration. Retail 
interest rates could in principle follow the same time pattern if banks in the different Euroland 
countries would pass changes in policy-related interest rates smoothly and with the same speed 
onto lending rates. In other words, when there is only one money market rate in Euroland and 
retail markets would not appear to be integrated, this could imply differences in the way changes 
in money market rates are extended to the borrowers within Euroland. A limited pass-through of 
interest rates could also be interpreted as pointing to a still high degree of imperfect competition 
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in retail banking (Cotarelli and Kouralis, 1994). And if the pass-through process is 
heterogeneous this could be interpreted as a limited institutional convergence process in 
Euroland banking (Kleimeier and Sander 2000). In our CEPS study we estimated a number of 
various specifications of pass-through models for all Euroland countries and both sub-periods. 
Without going too much into details some of the most important results are: 
1. The pass-through of policy interest rates onto lending rates is less than perfect in the short-
term as well as in the long-term, in all three lending markets and in practically all Euroland 
countries. 
2. As a rule of thumb the pass-through is in most countries the least efficient in consumer 
lending and the most efficient in corporate lending, thus pointing to the fact that the pass-
through may at least bear some responsibility for the finding of co-integration in corporate 
lending. 
3. Comparing across countries, the pass-through does not exhibit common characteristics. 
Rather it is characterized by a high degree of heterogeneity. 
4. Generally, and regardless of the model specification is appears that in the EMU phase there is 
some evidence for a smoother pass-through (with the exception of the consumer lending 
market). 
 
In sum, our results point to the fact, that the transmission process from money market interest 
rates to lending rates in Euroland still exhibits strong national characteristics, which are rooted in 
the specific features of the national finance and banking systems. While we find some evidence 
for the emergence of a smoother pass-through process in the recent EMU years it is still a far 
way from calling it a uniform banking system, in particular when speaking about consumer 
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credits. These results explain at least a part of the lack of co-integration in retail banking found 
earlier. 
 
3.5. The role of national competition 
So far, we have found a limited but somewhat increasing evidence for co-integrated retail 
lending markets. While our first point was that arbitrage played a not so important role, the pass-
through of policy rate changes onto lending rates also appeared to be imperfect. Consequently, 
additional regulatory efforts and pro-competition measures may be necessary to promote a 
smooth and more uniform pass-through of monetary policy changes. Increased competition or 
the threat of it as suggested by the theory of contestable markets may therefore help to harmonize 
the pricing behaviour of banks throughout Euroland and thus lead to a greater harmonization of 
retail rates.  
 
A first insight into the degree of competition can be obtained from looking into the market 
structure. As discussed in section 2, most European M&As have been national and have thus 
contributed to an increased national concentration in the banking sector as Tables 5 and A2 in the 
Annex show. Table 5 reveals that concentration is especially high in smaller countries such as 
Finland, the Netherlands, or Belgium where the two largest groups account for more than half of 
the market. In larger countries such as Germany or France the two largest groups account for 
clearly less than 50% of the market.  
 
The market structure, as measured by concentration ratios, is however, only an imperfect 
indicator of market behaviour and market conduct. In recent years, the European banking market 
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was put under pressure not only by the EU’s efforts in financial market integration but also by a 
shift in banking activities, a trend towards disintermediation, and competition from non-bank 
financial firms. Whereas the core function of banks is deposit taking and lending (for details on the 
Table 5: Concentration Indicators in 1998 
Country Share of largest 
banking groups 
Assets 
(in % of total) 
Loans 
(in % of total) 
Deposits 
(in % of total) 
France 5 largest groups 57.2 71.3 88.2  
 2 largest groups 31.6 40.3 43.9  
Germany 5 largest groups 40.5 42.3 44.9  
 2 largest groups 20.4 22.6 25.2  
Italy 5 largest groups 41.3 72.3 56.7  
 2 largest groups 23.6 38.4 31.1  
Spain 5 largest groups 69.5 46.6 66.2  
 2 largest groups 53.8 34.8 48.8  
Austria 5 largest groups 51.5 65.3 50.5  
 2 largest groups 35.6 46.9 37.2  
Belgium 5 largest groups 89.7 98.1 68.0  
 2 largest groups 52.0 58.1 26.3  
Finland 5 largest groups 90.5 88.6 42.9  
 2 largest groups 66.5 60.6 13.5  
Ireland 5 largest groups 69.3 52.3 70.4  
 2 largest groups 51.4 41.2 53.9  
Luxembourg 5 largest groups 25.7 23.6 24.5  
 2 largest groups 11.5 11.8 11.7  
Netherlands 5 largest groups 63.3 64.3 92.5  
 2 largest groups 51.1 46.1 69.5  
Portugal 5 largest groups 78.6 85.7 93.4  
 2 largest groups 47.5 54.3 66.3  
 Source: Belaisch et.al. (2001), Table 9. 
 
theory of financial intermediation see Diamond 1984 and Bhattacharya and Thakor 1993), European 
banks have long tended towards universal banking activities. Consequently, the banking activities 
allowable under European law reflect this universal nature of the European bank and includes next 
to deposit taking, lending, financial leasing, money transmission, payment services, guarantee 
provision also investment activities such as trading for own account or for customer, participation in 
shares issues, corporate advice, arrangement of mergers and acquisitions, money brokering, 
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portfolio management and advice, safekeeping of securities, and offering credit reference services,  
safe custody services (Zimmerman, 1995).  Among these activities banks have more recently shifted 
their focus away from interest-generating activities such as deposit taking and lending towards fee-
generating services such as investment banking. As Belaisch et.al. (2001) report, in the Euroland on 
average 22  percent of banks’ operating income in 1998 came from commissions compared to only 
16% in 1992. One reason for this shift were falling net interest margins (NIM). Between 1992 to 
1998 NIM have declined from 2 to 1.5 percent of banks assets. Belaisch et. al. (2001) interpret that 
as the result of increased competition, which makes the traditional lending activities less attractive 
for banks and drives them into more profitable fee-generating activities. According to Davis (1999), 
this shift was furthermore driven by factors including deregulation, advances in technology, the 
growth of institutional investors and the growth of securities markets. The growth in securities 
markets for examples encouraged corporate disintermediation whereas financial liberalisation 
increased non-bank competition from insurance companies or non-financial competition from 
department stores of car manufacturers.  
 
As the above discussion reveals, there is a trend toward decreasing NIMs. In order to validate this 
development in the retail market we have calculated the interest rate spreads – that is, the difference 
between the lending rate and the money market rate8. Figure 3 shows the results. With few 
exemptions spreads have fallen and the differences across countries have become smaller. However, 
it is a well-known fact that spreads are lower when interest rates are low. Thus, a part of this 
development can be contributed to macroeconomic developments. Moreover, consumer lending 
                                                          
8 De Bondt (1998) argues that interest rate spreads can be used as a rough indicator of imperfect competition. He 
uses a measure of spreads defined as the difference between lending and deposit rates, which can also be seen as the 
opportunity cost of intermediation. 
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rates have the least profited from these developments with spreads ranging from an average of 6.2 
percent in Germany to 2.7 percent in Finland under the single currency regime. In the more 
competitive corporate lending market spreads are mostly below 2 percent with notable exemptions 
of Germany and Ireland whereas for mortgages the spreads are ranging between 2.7 percent 
(France) and 1.4 percent (Ireland). These observations are in line with our earlier findings in the co-
integration analysis: The more competitive credit markets are, the smoother is the pass-through of 
interest rates and the more likely is a homogenous behaviour of credit market across Euroland. In 
other words, creating a single European banking market cannot only rely on the Europe-wide 
deregulation and facilitation of cross-border activities. Rather, in the context of localized lending 
activities promoting and securing a competitive environment at the regional or even local level 
remains essential.  
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Figure 3: Interest Rate Spreads 
Panel A: Mortgage Lending Rates 
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Panel B: Consumer Lending Rates 
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Panel C: Corporate Lending Rates 
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4.  Conclusions 
 
Our study  reviews the process towards creating a single European retail banking market. The 
EU has aimed at integrating the traditionally heterogeneous banking market in Europe by means 
of harmonizing legislation. While the wholesale banking market integration is considered to be 
more advanced, retail banking integration is still in its infancy. Cross-border lending, cross-
border mergers, and the promises of new technologies have not yet delivered the creation of a 
single retail banking market. In this paper we provide new evidence on this issue. In particular, 
we find that there are some tendencies for a more integrated corporate lending market, while 
consumer lending markets are still remain more fragmented. We identify three reasons for a lack 
of integration: A lack of international arbitrage, a limited pass-through of interest rate changes 
onto lending rates, and a limited national and international competitive retail banking 
environment. Regarding the first point, lending is still a very much localised activity and may 
eventually remain to be so. If, however, cross-border lending is limited this lack of 
internationalisation of lending could have been healed by a competitive behaviour of loan 
pricing. In such a case, the changes in the bank’s cost of funds would be fully passed onto the 
borrowers. Our study finds that also in this respect consumer credit lending is lagging behind its 
corporate lending cousin, explaining the lack of integration in Euroland consumer credit markets. 
Finally, however, our empirical work finds first signs that a closer integration is becoming 
visible after the introduction of the single currency. 
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Annex 
 
Table A1. Recent Mergers and Acquisitions Among Large Banking Groups 
Panel A: Domestic Mergers 
Country Post-Merger Bank (Pre-Merger Banks) 
Spain BSCH (Banco Santander + Banco Central Hispano + Banesto) 
 BBVA (Banco Bilbao Vizcaya + Argentaria) 
Austria Bank Austria (Bank Austria + Creditanstalt) 
 Erste Bank (Giro Credit + Erste SparCasse) 
Italy SanPaolo IMI (Instituto Bancario SanPaolo di Torino + IMI) 
 Banca Intesa (Banco Ambrosiano Veneto + Cariplo + CPP) + BCI 
 Unicredito ItaIiano (Credito Italiano + Unicredito) 
Germany HypoVereinsbank (Bayerische Vereinsbank + HypoBank) 
 Deutsche Bank + Bankers Trust 
France BNP-Paribas (BNP + Paribas) 
 Banques Populaires + Natexis 
 Credit Mutuel + CIC 
 Caisse d'Epargne + Credit Foncier 
 Societe Generale + Credit du Nord 
 Credit Agricole + Banque Sofmco + Banque Indosuez 
Portugal Banco Comercial Portugues + Banco Portugues do Atlantico 
 Caixa Geral de Depositos + Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor 
Belgium KBC (Kredietbank + Cera) 
 Bacob + Artesia Bank 
Netherlands ABN-Amro (ABN + Amro) 
Denmark Unibank (Unibank + Tryg-Baltica) 
Panel B: Cross-Border Mergers and Alliances 
Mergers Dexia (Credit Local de France and Credit Communal de Belgique) 
 Fords (Generale de Bank and ASLK-CGER Bank) 
 Merita-Nordbanken-Unidanmark 
 ING + Banque Brussels Lambert 
 BSCH + Totta & Acores 
 HSBC + CCF 
 Bank Austria + Hypovereinsbank 
Alliances/minority stakes BSCH-Royal Bank of Scotland-SanPaoloIMI-SG-Commerzbank--
Champalimaud 
 Credit Agricole-Credit Lyonnais-Banca Intesa 
 BBVA-Banco di Napoli-BNL-Credit Lyonnais 
 ABN-Amro - Banca di Roma 
Source: Belaisch et.al. (2001), Table 7. 
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Table A2: The Top 30 Euro Area Banking Groups 
Total Assets in US$ million in 1990 Total Assets in US$ million in 1995  Total Assets in US$ million in 1999 
Credit Agricole 241992 Deutsche Bank 368261  Deutsche Bank + Bankers Trust* 732534 
BNP 231463 Credit Agricole 328152  BNP Paribas* 688361 
Credit Lyonnais 210727 Cr6dit Lyonnais 327903  ABN-AMRO 504122 
Deutsche Bank 202263 ABN-Amro 290835  Hypovereinsbank* 504122 
Soci6te Gnerale 164741 Societe Generale 278006  Credit Agricole + Indozuez* 455792 
Caisses d'Epargne 152722 BNP 271635  Societe Generale 447545 
Dresdner Bank 147001 Dresdner Bank 253818  Dresdner Bank 427261 
Paribas 138668 Paribas 242219  Westdeutsche Land Giro 408372 
Commerzbank 112825 Westdeutsche Land Giro 237535  Commerzbank 381359 
DG Bank 109168 Commerzbank 220704  ING Bank Group* 326813 
IBSan Paolo 107403 Bayerische Vereinsbank 204423  Fortis* 323567 
Westdeutsche Landesbank Giro 104508 Caisses d'Epargne 187411  Rabobank Netherlands 291353 
Bayeriscbe Vereinsbank 102191 Bayerische Hypotheken & Wechsel Bank 177540  Credit Mutuel + CIC* 284461 
BNL 100967 Bayerische Landesbank 171816  Bayerische Landesbank 284064 
Amro Bank 93824 Krediteanstalt fur Wiederaufbau 158736  BSCH* 258872 
Bayerische Landesbank 90855 DG Bank 158227  DG bank 248297 
ABN 90411 Bankgesellschaft Berlin 157197  Credit Lyonnais 243708 
Bayerische Hypotheken & Wechsel Bank 90129 Rabobank Netherlands 155082  Banques Populaires + Natexis* 239673 
Rabobank Netherlands 90016 San Paolo Bank Holding 153115  BBVA* 237747 
BCI 88594 Generale Bank 126889  Caisses d’Epargne 235660 
NMB Postbank Group 84194 International Nederland Bank 125343  Dexia* 232601 
Cariplo 82103 Norddeutsche Landesbank 118507  Bankgesellschaft Berlin 220646 
Monte dei Pascbi di Siena 75694 Banco Santander 114174  SanPaolo IMI* 185403 
Credito Italiano 75223 Cariplo 107788  Banca Intesa* 179258 
CIC Group 74725 Sudwest LB 107602  Unicredito Italiano* 171730 
BBV 69986 Cr6dit Communal de Belgique 99941  Norddeutsche Land Giro 170759 
Generale Bank 67637 BBV 99174  KBC Bank* 163125 
Nordeutsehe Landesbank 67515 BNL 98662  Bank Austria* 140161 
Banques Populaires 64701 CIC 97839  BCI 132188 
Banque Indosuez 55316 Banca di Roma 93373  Banca di Roma 122145 
BBL 50548 BCI 92449  Merita Nordbanken* 112049 
 $ mio $ mio  change  $ mio change 
Average 114905  190739 +66%  320977 +68% 
Average tp five 210237  318631 +52%  576986 +81% 
Average top three 228061  341439 +50%  641672 +88% 
Source: Belaisch et.al. (2001), Table 8. * Banking groups are the result of recent mergers. 
